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Introduction 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, or DMCA, was enacted by Congress in 
October of 1998.1 Section 1201(a)(1) of the Act, known as the "anti-circumvention" 
provision, states that "[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that 
effectively controls access to a [digital] work protected under this title.".2 Sections 
1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) combine to form the "anti-trafficking" provisions, which 
provide that no one shall distribute technology that can accomplish this 
circumvention.3 Congress constructed a two-year delay in implementation of these 
provisions, thus, on October 28, 2000, circumvention of effective technological 
controls became punishable by both civil and criminal actions.4 Unfortunately, the 
presence of these provisions, along with courts refusal to recognize traditional 
copyright privileges and defenses in this area of "paracopyright,"5 chills programmers' 
speech. 
 
Long before the enactment of the DMCA, commentators worried that the 
passage of this proposed legislation would adversely affect the First Amendment rights 
of citizens.6 These First Amendment worries ranged from a generalized concern about 
the "right to read anonymously," implied in the First Amendment to the free speech 
rights of researchers and programmers whose business it is to create and analyze 
technological measures that effectively control access to a digital work.7 
 
This paper will focus on two current civil actions under the DMCA in which 
programmers are asserting that enforcement of the DMCA violates their First 
Amendment rights; Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes8 and Felten v. RIAA.9 
Before discussing these significant cases, Part I of this paper provides a sufficient 
history of copyright to understand the circumstances that brought about the DMCA. 
Part II provides a brief introduction to the concepts and terminology necessary to 
understand the cases. Part III introduces the two cases mentioned above which are 
currently before the courts. Although both cases directly implicated the DMCA, they 
reached that point in different ways. In Reimerdes, Universal City Studios used the 
DMCA to effectively challenge Internet posting of decryption software capable of 
decrypting DVDs, while in Felten, researchers sought reassurances that they would be 
permitted by creators of protection techniques for music CDs, to publish information on 
their successful decryption. Both suits additionally sought to have the anti-
circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA declared unconstitutional 
as to unacceptable restrictions on researchers' First Amendment Rights. Part IV lays out 
several of the leading alternatives to the current anti-circumvention provisions, ranging 
from elimination of the provisions entirely, to stringent encryption techniques 
controlled by trusted third parties charged with protecting the public interest in the 
digital copyright world. Although eliminating these provisions and placing digital 
copyright back within the realm of traditional copyright might be the best solution, it is 
most likely not a politically acceptable alternative. Thus, one of the measures 
permitting some amount of special protection for digital works, while allowing 
traditional copyright defenses, is probably the optimal solution. Part V is a brief 
conclusion that outlines the disposition of the discussed cases under the proposed 
alternatives. 
 
Part 1-History of the DMCA 
 
Copyright, as it is known in the United States, came into existence in response 
to the history of censorship in England. As early as 1557, Queen Mary granted a single 
publishing guild the right to publish books in England in return for its promise to obtain 
pre-approval for all publishing.10 This led to a system where publishers had great 
power over authors and their works. Many consider that copyright had its true 
beginnings in 1710, when the Statute of Anne was enacted in Britain.11 The Statute of 
Anne was necessary to stop publishers' oppression of authors and the public under the 
previous regime, and begin a system where authors had control of their own works.12 
 
When the Constitution was drafted, the members of the Constitutional 
Convention believed strongly that a healthy dialogue was necessary to protect the 
democracy they had envisioned. To promote this healthy dialogue, James Madison 
proposed a clause in Article I of that document, that authorized Congress to enact 
copyright legislation. Article I, §8, cl. 8, stated, "The Congress shall have Power… To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries."13 It is important to note that the Constitution expressly authorized that 
the copyright protections are to be for a "limited time" and are designed to promote "the 
Progress of Science and Arts."14 The Framers believed, and rightly so, that the 
healthiest democracies require a public dialogue. Thus, there is no protection given to 
ideas. And protected works were to be protected only long enough to provide incentive 
for the creators of the work to create more. At that point, such works would go into the 
public domain, where they could best support the healthy debate necessary for our 
democracy. As this article will demonstrate, provisions of the DMCA ignored these 
constitutional notions. In the legislators' zeal to protect those who believe their 
copyright privileges should be infinite, they have undercut the very purpose of the 
constitutional clause empowering their action. 
 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, copyright law had become too 
complicated for the average citizen to understand.15 It had also become too 
complicated for many of the legislators responsible for creating copyright law.16 The 
Congressional solution to this dilemma in the beginning of the twentieth century was to 
require all "interested parties" to propose legislation that they would deem 
acceptable.17 This complicated process brought many familiar names into the process, 
as content holders such as Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain), testified before Congress in 
1906 as to their reasons for believing that extended copyright protection should be 
available to them.18 There were multiple problems with this process of allowing 
currently interested parties to determine copyright legislation. Two of the most 
significant were: 1) Only powerful parties were represented-emerging technologies or 
yet-to-emerge technologies had no representation in this process; and 2) no one 
represented the public in this process. Since the public had no lobbying group and there 
were strong interests represented by the content-holders, the legislature abdicated its 
responsibility to protect the public interest. The result was a system in which current 
content holders-authors, publishers, etc.--were granted more expansive rights, while 
emerging technologies, such as motion pictures, were left out of the process. Copyright 
legislation has followed this path for most of the past century and much of the process 
is similar today. 
 
For generations, the United States was a net copyright importer, i.e. it imported 
more copyrighted material than it exported. Therefore, when the United States was 
approached with the first Berne Convention in 1886, to create international recognition 
of copyrights, the existing powers refused to sign that treaty.19 Although the United 
States eventually signed a reciprocal copyright agreement with England, it refused to 
sign the Berne Convention until 1988, over one hundred years after the first 
opportunity.20 By this time, the United States had become a net copyright exporter, and 
therefore, the burden required on this country to recognize other signatories' copyright 
was far outweighed by the benefit of having other countries recognize United States 
copyright. Also in the late 1980's, at approximately the same time as the United States 
became a signer of the Berne Convention, the United Nations World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), created in 1970, began to focus its attentions on 
copyright.21 Although the term "Intellectual Property" appeared in legal writings once 
or twice before 1900, the creation of WIPO spurred a massive growth in the use of the 
term and in case law depending on intellectual property as the basis of those actions.22 
This organization drew up a treaty that the United States did sign.23 The WIPO treaty, 
among other things, required recognition of copyright for digital media and protections 
for the anti-circumvention technologies used to protect that media.24 There were 
individuals who believed that the then existing United States copyright law adequately 
covered the terms of the treaty or required only minimal modification.25 However, the 
Clinton administration authorized a group to determine the best possible way to protect 
information available on what they labeled the National Information Infrastructure, or 
NII (commonly known as the Internet).26 Bruce Lehman headed up this effort, and 
offended many people by protecting what were perceived to be the rights of big 
business, but not the civil rights of the general citizenry.27 The "Green Paper" (or 
proposal) that was created by the group caused a negative stir among many concerned 
parties.28 When the final White Paper was released, some of the offending language 
had been cleaned up to make it seem as if concessions were being made, but the results 
were much the same as under the Green Paper.29 The White Paper, which was the basis 
for the DMCA, was all about protecting the interest of the current content holders, and 
little or no thought was given to emerging businesses or to the public interest.30 
 
This article focuses on the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA which 
had wide ranging implications which deserve more careful legislative consideration. 
Because a content owner could mix a little of his own work with work already in the 
public domain, and then protect the whole work with a technological protection-- which 
would be protected by the anti-circumvention provisions, the statute is overbroad. 
Under traditional First Amendment doctrine, overbreadth of a statute is reason for 
striking that statute down even when the statute is not overbroad as to a particular 
plaintiff.31 The statute offers language which looks like it may protect some traditional 
copyright privileges and defenses, stating that "nothing here should expand or restrict 
any First Amendment rights." However, the Second Circuit has labeled this language 
"clearly precatory," which in effect removes those traditional features of copyright law 
from application to the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions.32 When one 
considers the Constitutional mandate requiring that copyright be limited and intended 
only to promote progress, it is clear that at least the anti-circumvention provisions of 
the DMCA are overbroad. The question of whether these same provisions of the 
DMCA also violate First Amendment rights will be addressed in a later section. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION OF CONCEPTS AND TERMS 
A. Technical 
   
Public awareness of the serious danger to citizens' First Amendment and 
privacy rights from the provisions of the DMCA is very low, largely because of the 
complexities of the issues involved. One of the first court decisions concerning the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, was 
almost one hundred pages long and contained two hundred seventy-nine footnotes.33 
Judge Kaplan, District Judge from the Southern District of New York, even provided a 
table of contents for the decision.34 Although the legal issues are somewhat 
complicated, the initial barrier for many citizens is the language relating to technology 
and copyright.  
 
First of all, it is important to note that the DMCA only protects digital media. 
Digital media, as the name implies, is any media that is stored in digital form, e.g., 
music on a compact disc (CD), word processing documents on the hard drive of a 
computer, movies on a digital virtual disk (DVD), or books in electronic, or eBook, 
form. The reason for this deferential treatment of digital media is that, compared to 
more traditional media, digital works are cheap and easy to copy. Furthermore, unlike 
traditional media, a copy of a digital work may be indistinguishable from the original, 
thus enabling an individual other than the copyright holder to create as many "perfect" 
copies as he or she desires.35 
 
The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA are aimed at computer 
programs and other devices designed to circumvent technological protections installed 
by the copyright holder or his or her authorized distributor. Many of these protections 
involve some sort of encryption. Cryptography is the science of hidden writing.36 
Encryption is the process of using cryptography to protect information, in this case to 
prevent the end-user of the copyrighted material from making any unauthorized use of 
that material.37 Just as a lock that protects a safety deposit box requires a key to access 
the contents, an encrypted message requires a key to decrypt and view its contents. In 
the cryptographic sense of the word, a key is a string of characters and generally the 
longer the key, the more secure the encryption. 
 
"Breaking" a cipher, or "cracking" an encryption scheme means getting around 
the encryption and returning the information to its unencrypted form. This can be 
accomplished in many ways-sometimes by determining the key, sometimes by devising 
a way around the encryption. Encryption is not the only method of protecting digital 
information, but it is one of the most discussed. Because it is easier to "crack" the 
encryption if one knows the content of the encrypted message, encryption alone is not 
the ideal method for perfect protection of known text such as a CD or a DVD. The 
DMCA makes clear that one can only be prosecuted for "circumvent[ing] a 
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work."38 Although this gave 
some researchers hope that their actions would be outside the scope of the DMCA, thus 
far, effective control has been found to mean any attempt to control access, no matter 
how weak the attempted control.39 
 
Encryption programs, like all computer programs, are normally written by 
humans in source code, i.e., in a high level language with particularized grammar and 
syntax. This source code is then compiled or interpreted into object code, which is 
essentially a long string of 1's and 0's which can be read by a computer. As courts 
concur more frequently that all computer code is speech,40 the differences between 
these two types, or levels of code becomes less important. However, it is necessary to 
note these differences in order to understand the analysis contained in this note. 
 
B. Copyright 
 
In addition to the above technical items, there are some broad copyright terms 
and some specific DMCA provisions that are used in discussing these issues. In 
copyright, one significant defense or privilege to charges of copyright infringement is 
known as "fair use." Fair use is embodied in Title 17, Chapter 1, §107 of the traditional 
copyright law.41 Fair use is sometimes difficult to define precisely, but a few examples 
may help. If one owns a music CD and makes a copy of that CD for one's car, that is 
considered to be a "fair use" of something that you own. If one is a teacher and wishes 
to copy five pages of a several hundred page work for distribution to a class, that is 
considered to be "fair use." If one is reviewing a copyrighted work, quotes from that 
work may be included in the review without the author's permission, and that is 
considered to be "fair use."42 If one is parodying a work, and it is true parody, courts 
will generally consider that to be fair use as well.43 Fair use is "fair" even though the 
copyright holder does not grant any permission.44 Fair use is considered a 
constitutional requirement in that it balances the rights of the copyright owner with the 
citizens' interest in the free flow of information through the First Amendment. 
Although the DMCA specifically refers to the copyright code and says that doctrines 
such as fair use will remain, these exceptions generally have been read not to apply to 
violations of these anti-circumvention provisions.45 
Another traditional copyright privilege is the doctrine of first sale.46 This 
doctrine provides that after buying a copyrighted product, (e.g., a book), one has the 
right to do with that book as one wishes-loan it to a friend, read it to a child, give it to 
the library or sell it to a used book store. The copyright holder has no control over the 
product after that "first sale." Once again, the DMCA has no provision for allowing the 
doctrine of first sale to continue in situations involving anti-circumvention devices. At 
least one commentator has referred to the fair use and first sale doctrines as "taxes" on 
the copyright holder.47 
 
Because the DMCA creates such strict rules about the use of copyrighted digital 
media, in particular regarding that media which is protected by a technological anti-
circumvention device, Congress realized that certain exceptions to the anti-
circumvention provisions were required. However, these exceptions are extremely 
narrow and limited.48 There are several expressly stated exceptions to the anti-
circumvention provisions that are available to the general public. The most significant 
exceptions for this discussion are: 1) Reverse engineering is excepted for the purpose of 
creating a compatible product;49 2) Encryption research is an exception;50 and 3) 
Security testing a system you own is also an exception.51 
 
Although these exceptions have been asserted by programmers to apply in the 
cases below, courts have thus far refused to find that the defendants met the rigid 
qualifications of any of these exceptions. In Reimerdes, Eric Corley attempted to claim 
the reverse engineering and encryption research exception applied to his actions.52 The 
court concluded that Corley, as a publisher, did not meet the very narrow 
requirements.53 Although Edward Felten may have met the requirements for the 
encryption research exception, his case was different as shall be shown in the next 
section, in that Felten was the plaintiff, charging that his speech had been chilled by the 
threat of action under the DMCA.54  
 
II. CASES 
      A. Universal City Studios, Inc. et al. v. Shawn C. Reimerdes, et al.55  
           i. Facts 
 
Universal City Studios, Inc. (Universal), along with most distributors of motion 
pictures, distributes some movies in DVD (digital virtual disk) format.56 These DVDs 
are protected by an encryption system known as CSS.57 DVDs encrypted using CSS 
can only be viewed on players, either stand-alone players or computer drives, equipped 
with licensed decryption devices that allow for the user to play those DVDs.58         
 
In 1999, Jon Johansen, a fifteen year old computer hacker from Norway, reverse 
engineered59 a licensed DVD player and successfully "broke" the CSS encryption 
scheme.60 Johansen and others have claimed that this was done as part of the 
international effort to make it possible to use DVDs in computers using the Linux 
operating system.61 At the time this case was brought, there was no licensed DVD 
player for the Linux operating system. This claim, however, was not very plausible.62 
The decryption scheme created by Johansen, called DeCSS, was posted on multiple 
websites, including co-defendant Eric Corley's hacker website, or "e-zine,"63 2600 
("Corley's website").64 When the motion picture industry became aware of the DeCSS 
presence on the Internet, it sent cease-and-desist letters to web sites posting the code.65 
Some of those site operators complied.66 Corley's website, for example, removed the 
actual DeCSS code from its web site after the court granted plaintiff's uncontested 
preliminary injunction motion.67 However, in what was termed an act of "electronic 
civil disobedience," Eric Corley posted links on his website to other web sites that 
continued to offer DeCSS code.68 
 
The district court decision in Reimerdes contained a fairly clear statement of the 
facts.69 Since the Second Circuit relied heavily on the district court opinion in its 
affirmation, a thorough review of the opinion is important to the understanding of the 
case and issues at hand. 
 
The district court found Eric Corley to be an unsympathetic figure.70 With his 
long hair, tattered sports coat and sneakers, the court saw everything that it feared in a 
"hacker."71 It is obvious that, in the district court's view, defendant's act of posting the 
source and object code for DeCSS on his website was just another in a string of anti-
establishment, quasi-illegal (or illegal) acts perpetrated by defendant.72 Nevertheless, 
the court engaged in a careful analysis of the issues raised in the case. As a threshold 
issue, the court was required to determine whether computer code is speech and thus 
deserving of First Amendment protection. 
 
ii. Code as Speech 
      Universal requested that the court issue a permanent injunction against Corley's 
website to prevent it from posting DeCSS.73 The defendants argued that an injunction 
for this purpose would violate the Constitution's protection of free speech.74 Universal 
claimed that computer programs were not speech. Rather, it argued that DeCSS was the 
equivalent of a burglary tool-a "virtual crowbar" for breaking and entering onto its 
property, and was thus deserving of no more protection than any other burglary tool.75 
Until recently, this argument might have prevailed. In Bernstein v. U.S. Dept. of State, 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that source code was speech.76 However, that opinion 
also stated that it was doubtful that object code was speech. Initially, in Reimerdes, the 
district court was prepared to side with plaintiffs on this issue and agree that computer 
programs were not speech, but David Touretzky, Carnegie Mellon Computer Science 
Professor, free speech advocate, and expert witness for the defense, claimed that "after I 
taught him to read a hex dump of a C program, he changed his mind."77 The district 
court stated that all computer programs are speech, whether stated in source code or 
object code.78 The court next needed to determine the level of protection to which this 
type of speech was entitled. 
 
Defendants maintained that because code is expressive, it is entitled to strict 
scrutiny-the required level of judicial review of any challenge imposing a restriction on 
speech.79 Strict scrutiny requires a compelling government interest and a statute 
narrowly tailored to accomplish that government interest. Plaintiffs claimed that even if 
code is speech, it is also functional and that functionality requires that intermediate 
scrutiny be used to test the DMCA.80 Intermediate scrutiny requires an "important" 
government interest and a "close" relationship between the means selected and the end 
achieved. This is a lower hurdle for the DMCA to overcome than strict scrutiny. 
 
The district court found that, in a computer program, the functional element of 
the code outweighs any expressive element.81 While this is an interesting argument, it 
is ultimately unpersuasive. It could lead to the conclusion that if a program is not 
functional, it is not a threat, and deserves full expressive speech protection (for 
example, strict scrutiny applied to the DMCA's effect on speech).82 It is hard to believe 
(particularly for programmers) that liability would change based on whether the code is 
immediately functional or not, although this seems to be the test. Courts have 
determined that speech imminently leading to illegal action is unprotected.83 
According to the district court, the fact that a program can be executed so quickly to 
create illegal action is sufficient for the court to deny that code the protection of strict 
scrutiny.84 However, this leads to absurd results (for example, instructions to make an 
illegal drug are not an illegal drug, and a picture of an automatic weapon is not an 
automatic weapon, they are both protected speech). But what about a listing of code? 
So far, courts seem to be saying that a picture of code is code. However, this is the 
whole point of David Touretzky's Gallery of DeCSS.85 At what point does this 
information become illegal under the DMCA as unprotected speech? How many mouse 
clicks or keystrokes away from functionality must the code be to no longer be code 
capable of imminent harm? The district court's reasoning does not explain where this 
line should be drawn, rather it merely finds that Corley's postings of DeCSS are too 
close to functionality, i.e. within too few mouse clicks of functionality to be protected 
speech. 
 
Another First Amendment issue, largely ignored by both the plaintiffs and the 
court in this case, is that Corley is a media defendant. Corley had been publishing his 
website for 16 years.86 The original article listing the source and object code of DeCSS 
was just another article in Corley's magazine. That fact should have triggered the 
heightened First Amendment protection owed to the press. Corley's act of publishing 
the article on the Internet was no different from publishing in the brick and mortar 
world.87 
 
iii. Content-Based vs. Content-Neutral Restrictions 
 
In determining whether the statute should be analyzed under strict or 
intermediate scrutiny, one must refer to the purpose of the regulation. One must ask 
whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral. A content-based regulation 
is evaluated under strict scrutiny because it is assumed that the government is 
attempting to restrict a certain message.88 This is viewed as antithetical to the free 
exchange of ideas necessary for a healthy democracy. A content-neutral regulation, 
however, is one that is applied to all speech without regard to the message. Content-
neutral regulations of speech are often time, place and manner regulations (e.g., a 
regulation against using loudspeakers on residential streets). These content-neutral 
regulations are evaluated using an intermediate form of scrutiny as set forth in United 
States v. O'Brien.89 This is not to say that the same message cannot be expressed, 
rather it must be expressed in a different manner. According to the district court in 
Reimerdes, "[g]iven the fact that DeCSS code is expressive, defendants would have the 
Court leap immediately to the conclusion that Section 1201(a)(2)'s prohibition on 
providing DeCSS necessarily is content based regulation of speech because it 
suppresses dissemination of a particular kind of speech."90 The court rejects 
defendants' argument and finds that the DMCA is content-neutral.91 
 
The court was mistaken in finding that the content-neutral standard applied in 
Reimerdes. The DeCSS code is definitely expressive, and in many contexts, code is 
speech. Code can be used to state the existence of a fact. For example, "I have cracked 
the CSS protections on DVD's." That statement, without the code to back it up, proves 
nothing. It lacks the information necessary for others to determine whether there really 
was a crack, whether it was an effective crack, and how the crack occurred. Code can 
also be used to communicate a statement more effectively. For example, the statement 
"I have improved this encryption system by shortening the code to three lines in Perl" 
without the code offers very little information. However, with the code to provide proof 
and clarity, the statement can be tested and the improvement seen and judged.92 Since 
the code is expressive, a particular type of speech was being repressed by the statute, 
thus violating the strictures of the First Amendment. 
 
iv. Traditional Copyright Defense-Fair Use. 
 
As mentioned in Part II, fair use is a copyright term that has been interpreted in 
the past to be both a privilege and a defense. These interpretations differ in that a 
privilege can be exercised without much concern about court action, but a defense is 
only available after one has been charged with a violation. Fair use has been found to 
be a balancing element between the First Amendment and the copyright clause, both of 
which may be at odds with one another.93 In balancing these two constitutional 
provisions, it is important to recall that the copyright clause is the only clause granting 
legislative power that states its purpose and provides a built-in limitation. The framers 
were well aware of the abuses that could occur with government powers of copyright94 
and therefore noted that the purpose of this grant of power was "to promote science and 
the useful arts."95 However, the copyright grants must be valid only "for a limited 
time."96 This language limiting purpose and time frame in the grant of exclusive rights 
must be balanced against the First Amendment. The First Amendment contains no such 
limitations, stating simply and eloquently that "[c]ongress shall make no 
law…abridging the freedom of speech."97 When the legislature starts ignoring the 
purposes and the limitations that were constitutionally mandated for copyright, it is 
imperative that the courts intervene to remind the legislature that the First Amendment 
protects certain basic values in our society, and trumps laws to the contrary.98 
 
In Reimerdes, the defendants validly argued that without products such as 
DeCSS, those who wished to make what would otherwise be termed a fair use of the 
content of a legally purchased DVD cannot use the product in that way. The specific 
example argued most often in this case was that the DMCA makes it illegal for an 
individual to purchase a DVD and then play that DVD on a computer running an open-
source operating system in his or her own home.99 The court claims that DeCSS is not 
required to make a fair use of the work.100 Although there may exist a fair use 
privilege or defense for a professor to excerpt short scenes from a movie to show to her 
cinematography class, that privilege does not require that she be allowed to use the 
best, that is, digital, version of the work.101 Thus, shooting a video image of a 
television on which the DVD is playing is sufficient.102 Of course, if one thinks about 
the use here, it seems odd, since a cinematography class may learn little from the 
quality of print that would be available using this process. Defendants argue that this 
would require the user to go back to the "horse and buggy" version while the world 
moves rapidly ahead.103 However, the court in Reimerdes evidently found this to be a 
sufficient use.104 
 
v. Hyperlinks 
 
Aside from the regulation of the computer code, the other major First 
Amendment issue in Reimerdes was the injunction preventing the defendant from 
providing "hyperlinks" to sites providing DeCSS.105 Hyperlinks are embedded in the 
html106 code of web pages and by clicking on that hyperlink, a user may jump directly 
to another web site. These hyperlinks were provided so that the user could jump 
directly to the web sites of others who were providing DeCSS for download, often with 
just a click of a mouse to start downloading.107 Consequently, DeCSS is just one 
mouse click further away than if the code were posted for download on Corley's 
website itself. The court found that this did nothing to reduce the imminent harm 
presented by DeCSS.108 Corley's response was to change all the links that were listed 
on Corley's website to plain text statements of the address information for pages 
purporting to make DeCSS available.109 
 
Hyperlinks created a much more difficult problem for the court than the code 
itself. A link might lead to a web page that contains extensive information, which might 
just have a link to another page that only provides DeCSS. At what point is it sufficient 
to find the defendant liable for "trafficking?"  
 
The district court found that hyperlinks were also illegal under the DMCA and 
were not protected under the First Amendment. Hyperlinks were too close to 
operational, but in finding these links unprotected, the district court ignored the 
traditional "right to cite." It has been argued that a hypertext link is merely a citation to 
another source for the material.110 Thus, as a citation, a hypertext link is just another 
traditional piece of the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press, and should 
have been protected as a fair use. The court's failure to recognize this fair use opens a 
pandora's box of potential litigation involving online journalists who have cited to 
locations offering potentially illegal material. The court limits liability to those for 
whom clear and convincing evidence exists that 1) defendant knew "at the relevant time 
that the offending material" was on the linked-to site, 2) defendant knew that it was "a 
circumvention technology that may not lawfully be offered" and 3) the link was created 
or maintained "for the purpose of dissemination of that technology."111 These 
limitations help limit the implications of the holding that hypertext links are not 
protected by the First Amendment, but leave a chilling effect on journalists, who must 
consider before every Internet publication whether their work will violate this test. 
 
vi. Trial Court Holding 
 
Consequently, the district court found that although computer programs are 
speech, they were deserving of the lower protections of intermediate scrutiny. Under 
that scrutiny, the court found that the government's important purpose in this instance 
was protecting copyrighted works stored on digital media from the vastly expanded risk 
of piracy in this electronic age.112 Judge Kaplan also found that the statute was 
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest and there was no violation of Corley's First 
Amendment rights. 
 
The opinion yielded a mixed result for Corley's defense team. The opinion 
contained a strong statement that computer code was speech: 
 
It cannot seriously be argued that any form of computer code may be 
regulated without reference to First Amendment doctrine. The path from idea 
to human language to source code to object code is a continuum. As one 
moves from one to the other, the levels of precision and, arguably, abstraction 
increase, as does the level of training necessary to discern the idea from the 
expression. … But each form expresses the same idea, albeit in different 
ways.113  
 
This was a significant victory in the long fought battle to have computer code  
be declared speech.114 However that victory was severely tempered by the fact that 
Judge Kalan went on to find that as speech, code deserves very little protection. 
 
vii. On Appeal - Corley v. Universal 
 
The saga continued as defendants appealed and the Second Circuit heard oral 
arguments on May 1, 2001. Shortly after oral arguments, in what was viewed as a 
promising sign by advocates of free-speech on the Internet, the circuit submitted a list 
of questions to both parties that were directed at the free speech issues in the case.115 
Both sides submitted reply briefs and the court issued its decision, written by Judge 
Newman, on November 28, 2001. The circuit court affirmed the district court's decision 
with many quotes from and praises for its reasoning.116 It must first be said that there 
are many affirmations of programmers' free speech rights in the Second Circuit's 
decision. The fact that code is assumed to be speech is definitely a positive 
development. Since the courts both highlight the fact that the target of the DMCA is not 
the expressive element of the speech, but the functional element of the speech, many 
(including plaintiff's expert Michael Shamos) believe that if the functional element was 
removed, then speech would be protected.117 
 
The circuit court also recognized that a serious balancing had to be engaged in, 
weighing the copyright clause and the First Amendment when regulating hypertext 
links.118 The court went on to state that when courts are "considering First 
Amendment claims in the context of the pending case" they are obliged "to choose 
between two unattractive alternatives: either tolerate some impairment of 
communication in order to permit Congress to prohibit decryption that may lawfully be 
prevented, or tolerate some decryption in order to avoid some impairment of 
communication."119 
 
At the same time, programmers' free speech rights took a blow when the 
appellate court declared that the language in 17 U.S.C. 1201(c)(4) is clearly prefatory, 
stating that "[n]othing in this section shall enlarge or diminish any rights of free speech 
or the press for activities using consumer electronics, telecommunications, or 
computing products" is clearly precatory, and thus did nothing to apply these traditional 
defenses and privileges to the anti-circumvention provisions.120  
 
Eric Corley is not a sympathetic figure - there was an obvious lack of veracity in 
his dealings with the court. This led to reluctance on the courts' part in granting that his 
purposes might validly be protected. This in turn resulted in a case where both the 
district and circuit courts have said very favorable things concerning computer code as 
speech and yet found that that speech is not deserving of any real protection. Many 
advocates in the field believed that what was needed for free speech rights to prevail in 
this cyber world was a sympathetic figure with unquestionable motives to challenge the 
constitutionality of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. That figure soon 
appeared. 
 
B. Edward Felten, et al. v. Recording Industry Association of America.121  
           i. Facts 
 
On September 5, 2000, the Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) issued a 
challenge to the computer community at large - crack the SDMI's proposed encryption 
schemes that were designed to protect music CDs.122 Princeton computer science 
professor Edward Felten and a group of colleagues did just that.123 The invitation 
allowed the user to access music protected with these proposed schemes after passing 
through a click-through agreement which provided that a successful cracker could be 
compensated up to $10,000 if he or she agreed to further terms.124 Those further terms 
included a requirement that the successful cracker would "not be permitted to disclose 
any information about the details of the attack to any other party," in other words, the 
paid successful cracker would lose his or her intellectual property rights.125 This 
portion of the click-through agreement also provided, importantly, that if the cracker 
elected "not to receive compensation" he or she would not be required to assign any of 
his or her intellectual property rights to the RIAA, "although [they were] still 
encouraged to submit details of [their] attack."126 
 
Felten and his team of researchers successfully cracked five of the six 
technologies that were included in the challenge.127 They did not choose to collect any 
compensation and entered no agreement to assign their rights to their work to the 
RIAA.128 Instead, they did what academic researchers do in furtherance of the 
scientific method: they attempted to publish a paper describing their research and their 
successful attacks and subject their findings to a peer review.129 
 
In February, 2001, plaintiffs received word that their paper detailing these 
cracks of the SDMI information had been accepted for presentation at the Information 
Hiding Workshop (IHW) in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.130 The previous November, 
Professor Felten had been contacted by an executive at Verance, a defendant company 
which had created at least one of the protective technologies cracked by Felten's 
team.131 Felten discussed the paper with this executive, but did not send a copy of the 
paper until March 31, 2001, when a pre-publication copy was available.132 Felten 
specifically asked that the paper not be circulated outside of the company.133 
 
Shortly thereafter, Felten received a letter from the Secretary of the SDMI 
Foundation and Senior Vice President of Business and Legal Affairs of the RIAA, 
Matthew Oppenheim, Esq., that discussed many issues. However, the pertinent fact was 
that unless the SDMI group had pre-publication review with veto power, the 
Foundation would sue under the DMCA.134 This condition was demanded despite the 
fact that the click-through agreement had specifically stated that the cracking-party 
would maintain his or her own intellectual property rights unless he or she accepted 
compensation for the feat.135 Although the RIAA would later claim that Dr. Felten's 
suit against it and the SDMI was inexplicable as "[the RIAA has] unequivocally and 
repeatedly stated that [RIAA has] no intention of bringing a lawsuit against Professor 
Felten or his colleagues,"136 the letter's threat to bring action in federal court clearly 
revealed a previous intent to at least use the threat of a suit under the DMCA to chill 
Professor Felten's speech. As a matter of fact, the IHW authorities and Professor Felten 
eventually decided to withdraw the SDMI paper from the proceedings to avoid 
litigation.137 On April 26, 2001, the date the SDMI paper was to have been presented, 
the RIAA and the SDMI issued a joint public statement that they had no intent to sue 
Professor Felten and his colleagues over the paper. Of course, at this point, the threat of 
the suit had already accomplished its purpose, i.e. Professor Felten's team had 
withdrawn their paper from the IHW conference and there was thus no need for the 
threat to be maintained. 
 
On June 6, 2001, Felten and his fellow researchers, with the support of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),138 filed a law suit in the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey requesting an injunction enjoining the defendants 
from initiating any action against Felten and others for publishing the paper.139 At this 
point, the paper, with some improvements, had been accepted for the USENIX 
conference in Washington, D.C.140 Plaintiffs were seeking reassurance that they would 
not again be threatened with legal action for sharing their research results. 
 
ii. Motion to Dismiss 
Defendants, both the private defendants and the government, submitted motions 
to dismiss.141 They expressly avoided using mootness as a reason for this dismissal 
because that would require that there had been a controversy at some point, which 
defendants deny. Instead, defendants contended that Felten's suit contained no adversity 
of interests and that plaintiffs lacked standing. The private defendants alleged that their 
threat of action was not action-they disregarded the chilling effect that the threat of 
action could have on researchers' speech. Essentially, the private defendants claimed 
that since they had provided assurances that they would not sue based on the specific 
papers involved in this suit (as long as there were no material changes in the content of 
those papers), there was no longer a controversy between the plaintiffs and the private 
defendants. However, in First Amendment cases, "an actual and well-founded fear that 
the law will be enforced against" plaintiffs is sufficient for the court to grant relief.142 
 
iii. Standing     
      The classic case that describes the requirements for standing is Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife.143 Based on Lujan, the three requirements to establish standing 
are 1) an injury in fact, 2) that is caused by the defendant, 3) which can be redressed by 
a favorable court decision.144 Standing requirements are relaxed in First Amendment 
cases where the threat of self-censorship creates harm without actual prosecution.145 In 
this case, plaintiffs correctly claimed that the necessary conditions are met for a finding 
of injury in fact.146 
 
In First Amendment cases, a credible threat of litigation can serve as the injury 
in fact.147  Here, where the Felten team self-censored their research paper because the 
letter from the SDMI contained an explicit threat of prosecution under the DMCA, this 
prong of the test is met. Defendants claim that because they withdrew this particular 
threat, plaintiffs lacked standing.148 But since it is reasonable for plaintiffs to infer a 
continued threat from the existence of the defendant's prior threats149 as well as from 
defendant's unwillingness to disavow future litigation, this claim seems meritless. 
Because defendants refuse to waive future DMCA claims against Felten and his 
research team, there is continued adversity of the parties. 
 
iv. No Adversity of Interests 
The government's motion to dismiss focused on claims that the parties lacked 
adverse interests and that the court could not grant relief.150 The adverse interest 
claims were similar to those of the private defendants, but the courts' inability to grant 
relief was different. If the court could not grant relief, then the third prong of the Lujan 
test fails and the plaintiffs would lack standing.151 The government claimed that 
because the activities for which plaintiffs sought protective assurances were far too 
vague, the court would be unable to grant relief.152 The government also contended 
that because plaintiffs had not established that an injunction or lack thereof would alter 
their plans with respect to their future projects, "addressing Pintiff's [sic] claims would 
be of little practical utility to the parties."153 
 
In response to the government's motion to dismiss, Felten's legal team countered 
that "[i]n this action, Plaintiffs raise three major claims against the Defendants: that 
DMCA violates the First Amendment on its face; that, as applied, DMCA violates 
Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights; and that Congress exceeded its constitutional 
powers in enacting the DMCA. None of these requires significant further factual 
development."154 In particular, plaintiffs asserted that several of the projects that were 
either not being carried out or were on hold pending a ruling in this matter had been 
described in detail sufficient to satisfy a "live controversy" under the First 
Amendment.155 Plaintiffs further argued that the documents already before the court 
described with concrete detail the ways in which their plans for immediate and near-
future projects would be affected by the court's ruling, thereby rejecting defendant's 
claim to the contrary.156 
 
v. Hearing 
 
On Wednesday, November 28, 2001, Judge Garrett Brown of the Federal 
District Court in Trenton, New Jersey held a hearing on defendants' motions to 
dismiss.157Although Judge Brown allowed some very brief oral comments on the 
motions, he appeared prepared to grant both RIAA's and the government's motions, 
which he did orally from prepared notes.158 He agreed with defendants that because 
the threat of litigation did not remain throughout the process, there was no threat at 
all.159 EFF has since stated that it intends to appeal the decision.160 
 
Essentially, this ruling means that a large organization with equally large legal 
resources can censor a researcher by using the threat of a law suit under the DMCA 
and, after the researcher has relented, claim that it no longer wishes to prosecute. Under 
these circumstances, the court's decision in Felten leaves the researcher without the 
ability to seek redress. 
 
C. Summary of Cases 
      Both Felten and Reimerdes bring to light troubling issues regarding the 
constitutionality of the DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions. 
These provisions, without any exceptions or exclusions to permit the traditional 
balancing between copyright law and the First Amendment, have a clear chilling effect 
on free speech and are unjustifiably broad. Both of these constitutional infirmities 
traditionally weigh in favor of rejecting a statute on First Amendment grounds. 
      
The remaining problem is to determine an appropriate balance between the 
legislative desire to protect the interests of copyright holders and the national interest in 
maintaining the strength of the First Amendment which forms the cornerstone of the 
democratic freedoms enjoyed in the United States. Various approaches have been 
proposed for striking this balance; the following section considers several. 
 
Part IV - Alternatives to the DMCA. 
Because the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA 
can spawn such varied cases, it is difficult to tailor a comprehensive solution that 
addresses the issues arising in each case to the satisfaction of all parties involved. As 
the cases discussed above make clear, however, these provisions are chilling free 
speech and thus should be held to be unconstitutional. Although such a ruling might be 
criticized as creating a hole in the fabric of copyright protections that clothe content 
owners, the reality is that these content owners are attempting to use their political 
influence to broaden their privileges under copyright law. Unfortunately, they are 
succeeding.  
 
 It is possible that the DMCA could be saved by broadening existing exceptions and 
allowing the traditional copyright privileges and defenses to apply to the anti-
circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions. Although perhaps not the most ideal 
solution, this may be a politically feasible approach for balancing the interests involved. 
Many scholars have proposed interesting changes to copyright law that could be used to 
provide protection to digital works. Several of these changes are discussed briefly 
below. 
      
As Lawrence Lessig points out in his seminal work, Code and Other Laws of 
Cyberspace, the technological controls that are implemented in the digital world can 
take the place of legislative action.161 However, to the extent these controls really take 
the place of legislative action, it must be realized that constitutional restraints may not 
be applied to the creators of such controls without modification of the traditional state 
action doctrine.162 As two commentators recently noted: 
      
Where technological constraints substitute for legal constraints, control over 
the design of information rights is shifted into the hands of private parties, 
who may or may not honor the public policies that animate public access 
doctrines such as fair use. Rights-holders can effectively write their own 
intellectual property statute in computer code. Moreover, to the extent that 
the DMCA appears to legitimate technological controls over copyrighted 
works, without regard to their effect on public policy, the statute effectively 
grants rubber-stamp approval to such private legislation.163  
 
Noted digital copyright scholar Pamela Samuelson suggests that the DMCA 
should be interpreted only as an extension of current copyright law, i.e., as a copyright 
infringement statute punishing only infringing activities.164 In particular, Samuelson 
observes that  
 
[a]n overly strict, technical reading of the DMCA would seriously threaten 
freedom of speech. It does so not only by ignoring the communicative aspects 
of writing and sharing computer code per se, but also by restricting activities 
[such as citations to encrypted works or to locations known to include illicit 
material] which … involve traditional forms of expressive activity.165  
     
Samuelson also proposes that a broad "general purpose, 'or other legitimate 
purposes'" exception should be added to the DMCA to allow judicial interpretation of 
legitimate interests.166  
 
In Digital Copyright, one of the first detailed works on the DMCA intended for 
the general public, copyright scholar and Wayne State University Law Professor Jessica 
Litman reminds readers that copyright was intended to be a bargain between the public 
and a content-creator that would encourage the content-creator to generate more 
works.167 Litman proposes a radical change to copyright law - throw out the current 
law and replace it with a simple and easily understood statute that "recast[s] copyright 
as an exclusive right of commercial exploitation."168 Under this statute, making money 
from another's work or substantially interfering with a copyright holder's ability to 
make money would be actionable.169 However, neither the defeat of digital protections 
on a work for purposes of personal use nor the creation of tools for enabling others to 
make traditional fair use of a work would constitute a violation under the statute. 
 
Professors Julie Cohen and Dan Burk propose a fascinating alternative that 
incorporates an expansion of copyright management systems to include default fair use 
rights, along with a key escrow mechanism.170 Under this approach, the default fair 
use rights would be governed by a set of rules that define what uses automatically 
constitute fair use.171 The key escrow mechanism would serve to address more 
difficult cases in which a desired use exceeds that permitted by the default rules. In 
these instances, a potential fair user would apply to a trusted third party who retains an 
alternate key to the protected work, such as the Library of Congress, and request 
permission to use the work in a specified manner.172 The trusted third party would 
then determine if the requested use was permissible and, if so, provide the escrowed 
key to unlock the protected work.173 Although Burk and Cohen identify several 
problems with this approach, it appears to provide a reasonable alternative for both 
sides of the bargain - greater protection is afforded to the content holder than he would 
otherwise realize with traditional media, and reasonable fair use rights for the 
individual citizen are preserved.174  
      
David Touretzky, a Carnegie Mellon computer science professor and free 
speech advocate, suggests that the anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions 
should simply be removed from the DMCA so that publishers can resort to traditional 
suits against the actual infringer (as opposed to the person providing a tool that may 
make it possible to infringe) for redress.175 Although this approach may prove difficult 
in a digital world where information travels quickly, Touretzky validly maintains that 
the loss of a few dollars by content holders is preferable to the loss of long-standing 
constitutional rights by citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
Although several of Corley's defenses asserted in Reimerdes may appear 
reasonable on their surface, it is unlikely that a court will entertain arguments of 
overbreadth and vagueness on behalf of such unappealing defendants. Furthermore, 
although it may be argued that Corley's posting allowed fair use - users of the Linux 
operating system could now use DVDs on their computers - the fact that DeCSS was 
originally created and distributed in the Windows operating system diminishes the 
forcefulness of this argument. Corley's freedom of the press argument was largely 
ignored by both courts, and once again, the courts may well be falling victim to 
prejudice. A more sympathetic defendant may be key to a finding of traditional press 
privileges. 
 
The chilling effect that the DMCA had on Professor Felten's exercise of free 
speech could be lessened by adopting one of the alternatives discussed above. The same 
things that made Felten a good plaintiff in a law suit against the DMCA - the fact that 
he was engaged in legitimate research and was dissuaded from dispersing the results of 
that research by an outside threat - also made it easier for the court to find no 
controversy in that case. Professor Felten was engaged in legitimate research that 
provided a societal benefit: making digital media protections stronger and more 
protective of their content. The recording industry quickly realized that the threat of a 
lawsuit against Felten was a mistake, since a court would be more likely to find that the 
anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA were unconstitutional 
when confronted with a sympathetic plaintiff rather than a quasi-criminal figure like 
Eric Corley. The recording industry did their best to claim that there was never any 
controversy between themselves and Professor Felten so that the court would not rule 
adversely to the DMCA, a statute which they had lobbied long and hard to achieve and 
was extraordinarily protective of their intellectual property rights. Although Judge 
Brown sided with defendants, it seems likely that a reviewing court will recognize the 
error of this reasoning and rule purely on the constitutionality of the DMCA. It is hoped 
that in reaching their decision, the court will refute the arguments of defendants who 
attempt to reap more protection from the copyright bargain than the constitutional grant 
was intended to provide. 
 
There is a criminal case working its way through the system that demonstrates 
the dangers of the anti-trafficking provisions. In July 2001, Adobe Systems tipped off 
the FBI that Dmitry Sklyarov, a Russian citizen, was guilty of violating the anti-
trafficking provision of the DMCA in the course of his employment with 
ElcomSoft.176 Sklyarov had found a way to circumvent the protections on Adobe's 
eBook technology.177 This circumvention would allow an authorized user to make a 
copy, or to have the book read aloud if that option had been turned off on a particular 
eBook.178 Russian copyright law allows for a legitimate owner to make a back-up 
copy of a digital work.179 Sklyarov came to the United States to deliver a talk at a 
convention regarding the weaknesses of the eBook format.180 He was arrested before 
he was given the opportunity to give that presentation.181 
      
After protests and public pressure began to mount, Adobe chose to drop the 
charges.182 However, the federal government continued to keep Sklyarov in this 
country, although they released him on bail on the condition that he remain in Northern 
California.183 In December, 2001, charges against Sklyarov were dropped as he served 
as a focus for protests against the Justice Department in this action.184 Charges have 
not been dropped against Elcomsoft, Sklyarov's employer.185 The prosecution is 
continuing, with hearings on various motions scheduled for March and April 2002.186  
 
The fact that the DMCA gives United States officials the ability to jail a foreign 
citizen for coming to this country to give a lecture demonstrates a flaw in the system. 
Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of democracy and Sklyarov had broken no laws in 
Russia. Enforcement of this strict interpretation of provisions originally designed to 
extend copyright rules has led to international warnings for technical programmers to 
avoid the United States and to technical conferences moving to other countries for the 
safety of their members.187 Either courts need to recognize that the chilling effect of 
these anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions far outweighs any societal 
benefit they may have or Congress needs to address the issue with amendments or 
revisions to the DMCA. In either case, the current situation is an intolerable twisting of 
law into the form of copyright and First Amendment law, which has ignored the 
constitutional restrictions on both. 
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the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any 
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord."). 
 
FN47 Keith Aoki, Symposium: Sovereignty and the Globalization of Intellectual 
Property: Neocolonialism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-
Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 Ind. J. 
Global Leg. Stud. 11, 15 (1998). 
 
FN48 17 U.S.C. § 1201(e) (provides an exception for law enforcement and government 
activities, but not for the general public). 
 
FN49 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000). 
 
FN50 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000). 
 
FN51 17 U.S.C. § 1201(j) (2000). 
 
FN52 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319-20. 
 
FN53 Id. at 320. 
 
FN54 Plaintiffs' Complaint, Felten, No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J. filed June 6, 2001), 
available at 
http://www.eff.org/legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/20010606_eff_felten_complaint.html. 
 
FN55 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 
FN56 Id. at 303. 
 
FN57 Id. 
 
FN58 Id. 
 
FN59 Software reverse engineering involves reversing a program's machine code (the 
string of 0s and 1s that are sent to the logic processor) back into the source code that it 
was written in, using program language statements. Software reverse engineering is 
done to retrieve the source code of a program because the source code was lost, to study 
how the program performs certain operations, to improve the performance of a 
program, to fix a bug (correct an error in the program when the source code is not 
available), to identify malicious content in a program such as a virus, or to adapt a 
program written for use with one microprocessor for use with a differently-designed 
microprocessor.  
IT Encyclopedia at Whatis.com, at 
http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci507015,00.html. (last visited Nov. 9, 
2002). 
 
FN60 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 311. 
 
FN61 Linux is an operating system (based on AT&T's Unix operating system) that was 
developed as part of what is known as the open source movement. Open source means 
that the source code for Linux and all Linux derivatives must be available. It does not 
have to be free, but the source code will be available for any end user to modify. Those 
modifications must also be available for the open source community. Jon Johansen 
claimed to be part of a group called MoRE (Masters of Reverse Engineering), which 
"is/was a group of individuals in Norway and Germany who were directly responsible 
for the 'cracking' of the CSS scrambling algorithm. To this date the only member of the 
group identified by name is Jon Johansen, the author of DeCSS." The Openlaw 
DVD/DeCSS Forum Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) List 1.4.4. at 
http://eon.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/DVD/dvd-discuss-faq.html. (last modified May 3, 
2000). 
 
FN62 See Id. § 1.2.1. According to the FAQ at the Harvard openlaw site (operated by a 
community which is cosponsoring Johansen's defense) there is no evidence that this 
was accomplished as part of the organized effort to crack the CSS scheme and create 
the ability for a Linux player. Johansen did contribute this code to the Linux "LiViD" 
effort after it was complete. 
 
FN63 This term refers to an electronic magazine. 
 
FN64 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 312. 2600 can be found on the web at 
http://www.2600.com/. 
 
FN65 Id. 
 
FN66 Id. 
 
FN67 Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 
FN68 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 303-04. 
 
FN69 Id. 
 
FN70 Lisa M. Bowman, Putting a kind face on copyright battles, CNET (5/2/01) at 
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-256912.html?legacy=cnet. 
 
FN71 Id. The court goes to great lengths to describe Corley's previous acts that make 
him a bad character - his magazine has published articles on how to steal an Internet 
domain name, how to break into computer systems and a guide to the criminal justice 
system for readers charged with computer hacking. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308-
09. 
 
FN72 Defendant Eric Corley is viewed as a leader of the computer hacker community 
and goes by the name Emmanuel Goldstein, after the leader of the underground in 
George Orwell's classic, 1984. He and his company, defendant 2600 Enterprises, Inc., 
together publish a magazine called 2600: The Hacker Quarterly, which Corley founded 
in 1984, and which is something of a bible to the hacker community. The name "2600" 
was derived from the fact that hackers in the 1960's found that the transmission of a 
2600 hertz tone over a long distance trunk connection gained access to "operator mode" 
and allowed the user to explore aspects of the telephone system that were not otherwise 
accessible. Mr. Corley chose the name because he regarded it as a 'mystical thing,' 
commemorating something that he evidently admired. Not surprisingly, 2600: The 
Hacker Quarterly has included articles on such topics as how to steal an Internet 
domain name, access other people's e-mail, intercept cellular phone calls, and break 
into the computer systems at Costco stores and Federal Express. One issue contains a 
guide to the federal criminal justice system for readers charged with computer 
hacking… 
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308-09. The listing of these issues in the body of the 
opinion seems to indicate that the character of the defendant affected the outcome of 
the opinion. 
Professor Dan Burk of the University of Minnesota School of Law commented, "As 
soon as the judge says 'hacker,' you know you've lost." Bowman, supra note 70. 
 
FN73 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
 
FN74 Id. at 325-26. 
 
FN75 Brief for Intervenor United States at 19, Reimerdes 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (00-9185). 
 
FN76 Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997) 
vacated, scheduled for reh'g en banc, then in light of new regulations, remanded back 
to district court. 
 
FN77 David Touretzky, Remarks at A Great Debate: Are Computer Programs 
Protected Speech? Computer Immigration Series at Carnegie Mellon University School 
of Computer Science (Nov. 30, 2001). "C" is a computer programming language and a 
"hex dump" is a listing of numbers in base-16 (hexidecimal) that tells what was in all 
the computer registers, the stack and other selected information at the time of an error. 
David Touretzky is a Principal Scientist at the School of Computer Science at Carnegie 
Mellon University and a long-time advocate of free-speech rights on the Internet. His 
web gallery of DeCSS has subjected him to legal challenges of his own. He notes that 
that web gallery is mentioned in both court opinions in this case (the District Court and 
the Circuit Court) but that both refused to comment on the legal issues involved 
because "they realize that it's a tar pit and they don't wish to get pulled into it. But I'm 
going to pull them in." Id. Touretzky, DS (2000) Gallery of CSS Descramblers, 
available at http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/Gallery (Jan. 3, 2002). 
 
FN78 Additionally, the assumption that defendants are making should not be 
overlooked here. There is an implicit assumption in their argument (and since some of 
this argument prevailed it is worth some serious worry) that the DVD remains theirs to 
do with as they wish even after a consumer has purchased it. If DeCSS is a "crowbar" 
even if it's not used to do anything illegal, then we must assume that the thing being 
pried open belongs to the complainant. 
 
FN79 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 327. 
 
FN80 Appellate Reply Brief of Movie Industry Plaintiffs-Appellee, Universal v. 
Reimerdes, 111.F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00-9185).  
 
FN81 Judge Kaplan notes that "[g]iven the fact that DeCSS code is expressive, 
defendants would have the Court leap immediately to the conclusion that Section 
1201(a)(2)'s prohibition on providing DeCSS necessarily is content based regulation of 
speech because it suppresses dissemination of a particular kind of expression." See 111 
F. Supp. 2d at 328 (citing portions of Defendant's Post-Trial Memorandum). 
 
FN82 Plaintiff's expert, Micheal Shamos Ph.D., J.D., who serves as Co-Director for 
Carnegie Mellon University's Institution for eCommerce and as Special counsel for 
Reed Smith, L.L.P., has stated that if the computer code is not functional, or if the code 
is described in words, even words that the audience could then turn into effective 
DeCSS code, that would be protected speech and the DMCA could not reach that. 
Michael I. Shamos, Remarks at A Great Debate: Are Computer Programs Protected 
Speech? Computer Immigration Series at Carnegie Mellon University School of 
Computer Science (Nov. 30, 2001). 
 
FN83 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 
FN84 111 F. Supp. 2d at 332-33. The District Court further made note of the fact that 
the only human interaction required to perform the illegal act was a single mouse click. 
That single mouse click was not sufficient insulation from the imminent harm to 
provide protection for the speech. See id. at 331-34. 
 
FN85 See supra note 75. 
 
FN86 Declaration of Emmanuel Goldstein, Universal Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 
429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001) (00-0277). 
 
FN87 See Banco Nacionale de Mexico v. Narco News et al., Index No. 603429/00 
(N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 5, 2001) available at 
http://www.eff.org/Cases/BNM_v_Narco_News/20011205_decision.html (applied 
higher standard for proof of defamation from New York Times v. Sullivan to online 
journalists). "Brick and mortar world" is the term commonly used by those who 
function in both the online world and that "brick and mortar world" to differentiate 
between the two. 
 
FN88 See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 
 
FN89 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The court will uphold a content-
neutral regulation of speech if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than 
is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Turner quoting O'Brien as stated in 
Reimerdes. 
 
FN90 (emphasis added). 
 
FN91 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 329. A literal reading of the Constitution shows 
this dichotomy, the copyright clause provides that Congress must make laws to protect 
authors which will limit speech of others while the First Amendment provides that 
Congress shall make NO law restricting the freedom of speech. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, 
cl. 8; U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 
FN92 Programmers have worked for a number of years to create the shortest version of 
a workable form of the RSA encryption algorithm (one of the strongest encryption 
systems currently available). The current winner is the following 3-line Perl script 
which fits simply on a business card and can be entered into any computer that can 
interpret the programming language Perl: 
#!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*1Mla^*1N%0]dsXx++1M1N/dsM0<j]dsj 
$/=unpack('H*',$_);$_='echo 16dio\U$k"SK$/SM$n\EsN0p[1N*1 
1K[d2%Sa2/d0$^Ixp"|dc`;s/\W//g;$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)$/) 
The quest for the most diminutive munitions program, at 
http://www.cypherspace.org/~adam/rsa/story.html. RSA has been declared to be 
ammunitions by the federal government, although that status is not necessarily 
applicable any longer. The distribution of this code is still arguably illegal. 
 
FN93 "[C]opyright's idea/expression dichotomy [and thus fair use] '[strikes] a 
definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting 
free communication of facts while still protecting an author's expression.'" Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1984). 
 
FN94 VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 10, at 37. 
Thomas Jefferson was an outspoken proponent of limiting terms of absolute monopoly 
for ideas. In what may be the most famous example of this, he said: 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, 
it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may 
exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it 
forces itself into the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself 
of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other 
possesses the whole of it. he who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening min; as he who lites his taper at mine, receives light without 
darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the globe, for 
the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his condition, seems to 
have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, like 
fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density at any point, and like the 
air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement 
or exclusive appropriation. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (August 13, 1813), in The Writings 
of Thomas Jefferson 6 (H. A. Washington, ed., 1861), 175, 180. 
 
FN95 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
 
FN96 Id. 
 
FN97 U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
 
FN98 LESSIG, supra note 21, at 188:  
If copyright law must protect fair use-meaning the law cannot protect copyrighted 
material without leaving space for fair use-then laws protecting code protecting 
copyrighted material should also leave room for fair use. You can't do indirectly 
(protect fair-use-denying-code protecting copyright) what you can't do directly (protect 
copyright without protecting fair use. 
Id.  
On the other hand, on the House floor, Sonny Bono's widow (and replacement in the 
U.S. House of Representatives) said: 
Copyright term extension is a very fitting memorial for Sonny. This is not only because 
of his experience as a pioneer in the music and television industries. The most 
important reason for me was that he was a legislator who understood the delicate 
balance of the constitutional interests at stake. Last year he sponsored the term 
extension bill, H.R. 1621, in conjunction with Sen. Hatch. He was active on intellectual 
property issues because he truly understood the goals of Framers of the Constitution: 
that by maximizing the incentives for original creation, we help expand the public 
store-house of art, films music, books and now also, software. It is said that "it all starts 
with a song,'' and these works have defined our culture to audiences world-wide. 
Actually, Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever. I am informed 
by staff that such a change would violate the Constitution. I invite all of you to work 
with me to strengthen our copyright laws in all of the ways available to us. As you 
know, there is also Jack Valenti's proposal for term to last forever less one day. Perhaps 
the Committee may look at that next Congress. 
Statement of Mary Bono, (R-Cal), 144 Cong Rec H 9946, 9951 (1998). 
As Lawerence Lessig has pointed out, forever is forever, even if it is minus one day or 
five days, or five years. (The reason for the Mickey Mouse moniker is that some 
commentators have pointed out that every time the copyright is about to run out on 
Mickey Mouse, Congress lengthens the copyright term.). 
LESSIG, supra note 22, at 107. 
 
FN99 An open-source operating system (the most prevalent example is Linux) is an 
operating system for which the code is provided. There is no secret as to how these 
operating systems run, it is shared knowledge and anyone can update their own system 
and offer those systems to others. As a matter of fact, in some versions of open source 
licensing, if you make a change to the operating system, you are required by the license 
to provide those changes to the open-source community. Although DVD players were 
available for the Windows and Macintosh operating systems, at the time of this case, 
there was no licensed DVD player for Linux. 
 
FN100 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp 2d at 337-338. The court also notes that had Congress 
intended for the fair use exception to apply to the anti-circumvention provisions, that 
would have been clear in the statute. Id. at 324. 
 
FN101 Id. at 337. 
 
FN102 Id. at 338. 
 
FN103 Id. 
 
FN104 Id. at 321-323. 
 
FN105 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 340. 
 
FN106 "Html" stands for hyper text markup language which is the programming 
language used for World Wide Web applications. 
 
FN107 Id. at 325. 
 
FN108 The basic argument here is that a program is somehow different from 
instructions to make LSD because the program can be executed with too little human 
effort. Somehow the courts seem to be saying that the fact that there is little human 
effort involved in running a program makes it somehow so that the humans are not 
responsible. This seems spurious at best-the mantra of programmers has become much 
like the mantra of the NRA, "Guns don't kill people, people kill people." That is, 
"Programs don't infringe copyrights, people infringe copyright." Just because little 
human effort is required to run the program that may infringe someone's copyright does 
not mean that the computer can run the program by itself. And programmers are talking 
about speech-something which enjoys a clearly preferential status under the United 
States Constitution. 
 
FN109 One of the examples used by the court is what if a newspaper article had a link 
to a site that provided DeCSS as part of a story about this issue? Could that be enjoined 
from being printed? See Banco Nacional de Mexico, S.A. v. Mario Renato Menèndez 
Rodriques, Al Giordano and The Narco News Bulletin (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2001) 
available at http://www.eff.org/Cases/BNM_v_Narco_News/20011205_decision.html. 
 
FN110 See LITMAN, supra note 6, at 183. 
 
FN111 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 341. 
 
FN112 Id. at 329. 
 
FN113 Id. at 326. 
 
FN114 Cindy Cohn, who began her battle with this issue with the Daniel Bernstein case 
in 1995, was also involved in this case for the EFF. This has been a long battle for 
some. 
 
FN115 Those questions were: 
1. Are the anti-trafficking provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act content-
neutral? See 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 328-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
2. Does DeCSS have both speech and non-speech elements? 
3. Does the dissemination of DeCSS have both speech and non-speech elements? 
4. Does the use of DeCSS to decrypt an encrypted DVD have both speech and non-
speech elements? 
5. Does the existence of non-speech elements, along with speech elements, in an 
activity sought to be regulated alone justify intermediate level scrutiny? 
6. If DeCSS or its dissemination or its use to decrypt has both speech and non-speech 
elements and is not subject to intermediate level scrutiny simply because of the non-
speech elements, is intermediate level scrutiny appropriate because of the close causal 
link between dissemination of DeCSS and its improper use? See 111 F. Supp. 2d at 
331-32. 
7. If the District Court is correct that the dissemination of DeCSS "carries very 
substantial risk of imminent harm" 111 F. Supp. 2d at 332, does that risk alone justify 
the injunction? In other words, does that risk satisfy the requirements for regulating 
speech under Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), thereby rendering 
unnecessary an inquiry as to whether non-speech elements of DeCSS or its 
dissemination or its use (if such exists) may be regulated under United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)? 
8. Are the three criteria identified at 111 P. Supp. 2d 333 the correct criteria for 
determining the validity, under intermediate level scrutiny, of the use of DeCSS that 
has been enjoined? 
9. If not, what modification or supplementation would be required to conform to First 
Amendment requirements? 
10. Are the three criteria identified in 111 F. Supp. 2d 341 and the "clear and 
convincing evidence" standard the correct criteria and the correct standard of proof for 
testing the validity of the injunction's prohibition of posting on the defendant's website 
and of linking? 
If not, what modification or supplementation would be required to conform to First 
Amendment requirements? 
available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAA_DVD_cases/20010508_ny_augment_order.html. 
 
FN116 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 
FN117 Micheal Shamos, Remarks at A Great Debate: Are Computer Programs 
Protected Speech? at the Computer Immigration Series at Carnegie Mellon University 
School of Computer Science (Nov. 30, 2001). Also note - there are programs that now 
can take computer code and turn it into simple English and vice versa. It will not be 
long before computers can read English, at that point, may we suppress all language on 
the view that it is functional? There are even t-shirt versions of DeCSS which are 
definitely non-functional. (See http://www.copyleft.net - Copyleft has been named as a 
defendant in DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 93 Cal. App. 4th 648, (2001), 
charging infringement of trade secrets).  
 
FN118 Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 
FN119 Id. 
 
FN120 Id. at 32. 
 
FN121 Civil Action No. CV-01-2669 (D.N.J. filed June 6, 2001), available at 
http://www.eff.org/legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA. 
 
FN122 The invitation said, in part:  
Here's an invitation to show off your skills, make some money, and help shape the 
future of the online digital music economy. 
The Secure Digital Music Initiative [SDMI] is a multi-industry initiative working to 
develop a secure framework for the digital distribution of music. SDMI protected 
content will be embedded with an inaudible, robust watermark or use other technology 
that is designed to prevent the unauthorized copying, sharing, and use of digital music. 
We are now in the process of testing the technologies that will allow these protections. 
The proposed technologies must pass several stringent tests: they must be inaudible, 
robust, and run efficiently on various platforms, including PCs. They should also be 
tested by you.  
So here's the invitation: Attack the proposed technologies. Crack them. 
By successfully breaking the SDMI protected content, you will play a role in 
determining what technology SDMI will adopt. 
Plaintiff's Complaint at 32, Felten v. RIAA (No. CV-01-2669) available at 
http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/20010606_eff_felten_complaint.html. 
 
FN123 Professor Felten's research includes analyzing and improving various Internet 
security protocols. Felten testified as an expert witness for the defendant in the 
Reimerdes case and for the government in the anti-trust case against Microsoft. 
Frequently Asked Questions about Felten & USENIX v. RIAA Legal Case, at 
http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/faq_felten.html. 
 
FN124 Plaintiff's Complaint at 32, Felten v. RIAA (No. CV-01-2669) available at 
http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/20010606_eff_felten_complaint.html. 
 
FN125 Id.  
 
FN126 Id. 
 
FN127 Id. at item 37. 
 
FN128 Id. 
 
FN129 Id. 
 
FN130 Id. at item 38. 
 
FN131 Id. at item 39. 
 
FN132 Id. 
 
FN133 Id. at 40. 
 
FN134 RIAA/SDMI Legal Threat Letter, available at 
http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/20010409_riaa_sdmi_letter.html. In 
pertinent part, the letter stated: 
In addition, because the public disclosure of your research would be outside the limited 
authorization of the Agreement [the click-through agreement discussed above], you 
could be subject to enforcement actions under federal law, including the DMCA. The 
Agreement specifically preserves any rights that proponents of the technology being 
attacked may have "under any applicable law including, without limitation, the U.S. 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, for any acts not expressly authorized by this 
Agreement." The Agreement simply does not "expressly authorize" participants to 
disclose information and research developed through participation in the Public 
Challenge and thus such disclosure could be the subject of a DMCA action. 
(emphasis added). 
 
FN135 Plaintiff's Complaint at 32, Felten v. RIAA (No. CV-01-2669). 
 
FN136 Statement by RIAA's Cary Sherman on Felten Lawsuit (June 6, 2001), available 
at http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/20010606_riaa_statement.html. 
 
FN137 Plaintiff's Complaint at 2, Felten v. RIAA (No. CV-01-2669). 
 
FN138 The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) was founded in 1990 to "protect our 
fundamental rights regardless of technology, to educate the press, policymakers, and 
the general public about civil liberties issues related to technology…" EFF web site, 
available at http://www.eff.org/abouteff.html. 
 
FN139 Plaintiff's Complaint at G, Felten v. RIAA (No. CV-01-2669). 
 
FN140 Id. at 50. 
USENIX is the Advanced Computing Systems Association. Since 1975 the USENIX 
Association has brought together the community of engineers, system administrators, 
scientists, and technicians working on the cutting edge of the computing world. The 
USENIX conferences have become the essential meeting grounds for the presentation 
and discussion of the most advanced information on the developments of all aspects of 
computing systems. The USENIX Association and its members are dedicated to: 
" problem-solving with a practical bias, 
" fostering innovation and research that works, 
" communicating rapidly the results of both research and innovation,  
" providing a neutral forum for the exercise of critical thought and the airing of 
technical issues. 
from the USENIX web site, available at http://www.usenix.org/. 
 
FN141 Defendant RIAA's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Felten v. 
RIAA, No. CV-01-2669 (July 12, 2001) available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010712_riaa_mtd_memo.html. 
Defendant John Ashcroft's memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Felten v. 
RIAA, No. CV-01-2669 (Sept. 25, 2001) available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010925_doj_dismiss_motion_memo.
html. 
 
Fn142 Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) 
(emphasis added). 
 
FN143 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992). 
 
FN144 Id. 
 
FN145 ACLU v. Miller, 977 F.Supp. 1228, 1231 (N.D. Ga. 1997); Virginia v. American 
Booksellers, 484 U.S. 383 (1988); Waters v. Barry, 711 F.Supp. 1125 (D.C.D.C. 1989).  
 
FN146 Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to RIAA's Motion to Dismiss at 19, Felten v. 
RIAA, No. CV-01-2669 (Aug. 13, 2001) available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010813_eff_felten_brief.html.  
 
FN147 American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. at 393; Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 
442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979); New Hampshire Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. 
Gardner, 99 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 
FN148 Defendant RIAA's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 20-23, 
Felten v. RIAA, No. CV-01-2669 (July 12, 2001) available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20010712_riaa_mtd_memo.html. 
 
FN149 "Past threats of enforcement are evidence 'bearing on whether there is a real and 
immediate threat of repeated injury.'" Opposition Brief, Felten v. RIAA, No. CV-01-
2669 (Aug. 13, 2001) available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20011025_eff_felten_opp_brief.rtf 
(quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496 (1974)). 
 
FN150 Defendant John Ashcroft's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, 
Felten, (No. CV-01-2669). 
 
FN151 Id. at 18. 
 
FN152 Id. at 20-23. 
 
FN153 Id. at 23. 
 
FN154 Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendant John Ashcroft's Motion to Dismiss 
at 17-18 (footnote omitted), Felten (No. CV-01-2669 (GEB)). 
 
FN155 Id. at 19-20. 
 
FN156 Id. at 21-22. 
 
FN157 Transcript of Motions Before Honorable Garrett E. Brown, United States 
District Court Judge, Felten v. RIAA, No. CV-01-2669 (Nov. 28, 2001) available at 
http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/Felten_v_RIAA/20011128_hearing_transcript.html. 
 
FN158 Id. 
 
FN159 Id. at 30. 
 
FN160 Judge Denies Scientists' Free Speech Rights, EFF Press Release (Nov. 28, 
2001) at http://www.eff.org/effector/HTML/effect14.37/html. 
 
FN161 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 135 
(1999). 
 
FN162 For an interesting discussion of reasons for removing the state action doctrine 
because of these technological actions, see, Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to 
Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 
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